Shorenstein APARC expert sees no fundamental shift in China-North Korea relations

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Media reports suggest that China is moving its allegiance away from North Korea, following a series of recent provocative acts by Pyongyang. But Dr. Sunny Seong-Hyon Lee, a fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, says there will be no real shift in the relationship anytime soon.

China harshly rebuked North Korea’s third nuclear test in words, yet stopped short of translating words into action. China quickly distanced itself when North Korea executed the young leader’s guardian Jang Song-thaek, saying that was an “internal affair” of North Korea. President Barack Obama said China was “recalculating” its policy toward North Korea. Looking at these signals, Lee asks: does this narrative match reality?

Lee, this year’s Pantech Fellow on Korean Affairs at Shorenstein APARC in the Freeman Spogli Institute, has been conducting research on Chinese perspectives on North Korea using primary and secondary sources. He has a lengthy career as a foreign correspondent at the Korea Times based in China for 11 years, reporting primarily on North Korea. Lee sat down with Shorenstein APARC to answer a few questions about his research and forthcoming book.

How important a role does media play in assessing North Korea?

News media are a central channel for understanding North Korea’s current affairs. Quite often, media are the only channel for the public. Journalists are challenged to deduce the on-the-ground situation in North Korea by examining various signals that North Korea chose to reveal to the outside. Journalists also turn to diplomats, academics and intelligence officials. Media allows us to piece together a telling picture of the DPRK’s current state of affairs. That doesn’t necessarily mean that the audience can take the media reports without critical attitudes either, especially when it comes to North Korea’s elite politics, which could be quite enthralling.

Lee describes the gap in perception among outside observers concerning the China-North Korea relationship.
Photo Credit: Sunny Seong-Hyon Lee

How does your journalism background influence your research approach?

Diplomacy surrounding North Korea is a murky topic with its share of secrecy. Figuring out North Korea’s moves is like a religious experience. You often fail to comprehend why it happens. But as a journalist, you encounter so many “false prophets” who claim to know. (To illustrate this point, I wore religious attire during my lecture). It’s also the work of diplomats and you don’t normally strike a conversation with North Korean nuclear negotiator. Journalists, due to the nature of their work, have some access. We chase after these people, wait for them at the airport to get quotes, and attend their press conferences. Some of us get to develop personal relationships with them. In general, journalism allows you to get a glimpse of what is really happening. But the public often doesn’t know how journalism surrounding North Korea works either, for example, the delicate journalist-source relationship, as well as how journalists struggle to connect the dots when he or she hears a fragmented piece of information from an intelligence official. I was shocked when a very senior-level diplomat told me “90% of the media reports about North Korea are inaccurate.”  I think he was frank with me. So, I interviewed journalists who cover North Korea, asking them how they write the stories they write. I also interviewed diplomats, academics, and intelligence officials whom journalists turn to for their story quotes. To protect my sources, I have kept most of them anonymous in my upcoming book, which I hope to finish this summer.

How would you characterize Chinese public opinion toward North Korea?

It’s important to keep in mind that the Chinese government portrays a different position than the average citizen. We do see ebb and flow in the freedom to critically evaluate North Korea in China. On an individual level, many Chinese now use personal blogs and social media sites such as Weibo as forums for freer conversation on sensitive topics. A video clip depicting two boxers fighting in a ring, thought to be a metaphor for U.S.-North Korea relations, went ‘viral’ on social media and stirred up a great deal of conversation. Many Chinese are dissatisfied with the government’s tepid response to North Korea’s nuclear provocations. But the Chinese government approaches the issue from the point of national interest. A socialist political system is also pronounced in making rhetorical statements that don’t necessarily square with its actions. So, when it comes to the North Korean narrative, you see a state versus public sentiment divide, and also rhetoric versus action divide. It can be quite confusing to outside analysts. It’s hard to pin down China. China sees North Korea as a strategic benefit. Today, a very real perception gap exists among outside observers where China exactly stands on North Korea.

Will the Chinese government ever be persuaded by its citizens to change its policy toward North Korea?

Public discontent is unlikely to garner a reaction from the government. China is not structurally organized to respond to public opinion like the United States, nor does it want to. The Communist Party decision-making is insulated in many ways, and has been quite successful in closely monitoring activism. Even so, analysts do argue that a ‘threshold’ exists by which the government may be required to respond.

What factors suggest China’s policy has changed in style but not in substance?

Many factors exist that suggest China’s stance toward North Korea has changed. Most notably was Deng Yuwen’s Financial Times op-ed. Yuwen was the deputy editor of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School; he wrote that China should “abandon” North Korea in Feb. 2013. His critical stance drew international interest since he was a government-associated leader pushing a counter-argument. A few weeks later, Chinese premier Xi Jinping also said, “no country should be allowed to throw the region or the whole world into chaos.” While North Korea was not pinpointed, analysts believe Xi was reprimanding Pyongyang in response to its nuclear brinkmanship. Those signals, coupled with severance of some trade and financial ties, provide leverage to the argument that China is changing its tolerance of ‘misbehavior’ from North Korea. But, those signals are not as substantive as the media has led many to believe.

Should we be optimistic that China-North Korea relations will improve?

I happen to be a bit of a pessimist. The phrase huan tang bu huan yao – a change in name but not in substance – illustrates my thesis. No tangible shift in China’s policy has occurred and the prospects for genuine change in the future are slim. A key point to remember is China determines its position based on America’s involvement. North Korea is effectively China’s ‘policy darling,’ ultimately used as a buffer (physical and psychological) against the American sphere of influence in East Asia, which China believes is meant to contain China. I believe the ‘pivot to Asia’ has created in some Chinese policymakers a certain paranoia. Thus, China still values North Korea and is unlikely to sever ties with its neighbor, as long as the strategic rivalry, competition for leadership, deep-rooted mutual mistrusts and suspicions of intentions between Washington and Beijing persist. Against that backdrop, for the short-term and medium-term, China-North Korea relations will not change because they need each other strategically in East Asia. Maybe in the long-term there is hope.

Lee presented his research at a seminar entitled, “Uncomfortable Relationship: Will China Abandon North Korea?” on April 18. The presentation slides from the event are available below.