Between about 1990 and 1996, North Korea experienced what can only be described as a catastrophic economic collapse, which included a 70 percent reduction in food production compared to the late 1980s. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) initially insisted that the agriculture collapse was a consequence of natural disasters. However, it is clear that the seeds of this catastrophe had been planted decades earlier, the result of ill-advised and ultimately unsustainable national agricultural policies. Yet difficult as the situation is, it is not without options for significant improvement. This paper outlines a strategy for agricultural revitalization in North Korea, which could, in the foreseeable future, enable the DPRK to produce -- domestically and in a sustainable manner -- nearly all the food needed to supply a basic balanced diet for its population. Whether this strategy can be implemented, or indeed whether it is the best strategy for the DPRK in the longer term, depends on many factors outside the farm sector, including world and regional international political issues, and DPRK policy choices regarding participation in world trade and commerce.

An international conference in mid-2005 explicitly considered some of the appropriate steps that would be needed to provide substantial international assistance (Stanley Foundation 2005). The September 2005 joint statement from the six party talks raised the hope that a resolution of the nuclear weapons issues might open the door to international development assistance for the DPRK. However, subsequent developments suggest that agreements leading to significant economic assistance are still elusive. The DPRK also announced in September 2005 that it would accept no further humanitarian aid from international donors, effective at the end of the year. Only development assistance would be accepted. This position implies an end to the food and medical assistance that has played a central role in stabilizing the DPRK economy over the last decade. Whether the DPRK government believes that its farm production has risen to a level that can truly feed the population, that food and fertilizer will be available from other channels (e.g., China and the Republic of Korea, or ROK), or that a renewed famine is preferable to accommodation of continued international aid monitors, remains to be seen. But regardless of their motivation, it appears that DPRK authorities believe that the domestic food supply can be significantly improved within a very short time. This paper outlines one strategy through which that outcome becomes realistic.