

<rss version="2.0"><channel><title>SCP Publications</title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/</link><description>Recent publications from SCP</description><language>en-us</language><copyright>Public domain</copyright><ttl>60</ttl><item><title><![CDATA[China's Vision of World Order]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23844</link><description><![CDATA[Book Chapter - Thomas Fingar<br />National Bureau of Asian Research, October 2012<br />This chapter by Thomas Fingar examines three sets of factors that shape Chinese thinking and actions with respect to world order and examines the possible contours and implications of the order China may seek.]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 30 Nov 2012 10:05:18 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23844?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[China's Rise: Contingency, Constraints, and Concerns]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23585</link><description><![CDATA[Book Review - Thomas Fingar<br />Survival: Global Politics and Strategy vol. 54, Jan. 31, 2012<br />Aaron Friedberg’s thoughtful and thought-provoking <i>A Contest for Supremacy</i> does many things well, but what it does best is to underscore the uncertainties and contingencies that must be factored into any analysis of China’s rise and its implications for the United States and other nations.]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Feb 2012 10:52:09 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23585?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Road to Collective Debt in Rural China: Bureaucracies, Social Institutions, and Public Goods Provision]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23551</link><description><![CDATA[Journal Article - Xueguang Zhou<br />Modern China, September 2011<br />Focusing on the episodes of the government’s Paved Road to Every Village (PREV) project in an agricultural township in northern China, this article examines two research issues: First, the role of state policies, government bureaucracies, and village cadres in the provision of public goods, especially the unintended consequences that led to huge collective debts and the erosion of the collective basis of governance and second, the role of local institutions and social relations in resource mobilization, problem solving, and response to crises, especially in the aftermath of the PREV project.]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 19 Jan 2012 12:04:07 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23551?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Autumn Harvest: Peasants and Markets in Post-Collective Rural China]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23550</link><description><![CDATA[Journal Article - Xueguang Zhou<br />The China Quarterly vol. 208, December 2011<br />Based on ethnographic research on the autumn harvest in a township in northern China, this study sheds light on distinctive modes of market transactions across produces, and diverse interactions between markets and local institutions involving different co-ordination mechanisms, rhythms and social relationships.]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 19 Jan 2012 11:57:02 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23550?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Rethinking Property Rights as a Relational Concept: Access to Financial Resources Among Small and Mid-Sized Firms]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23549</link><description><![CDATA[Journal Article - Xueguang Zhou, Lulu Li<br />Chinese Sociological Review vol. 44, No. 1, Fall 2011<br />The prevailing image in the economic and legal literature
portrays property rights as “a bundle of rights” and emphasizes their
exclusivity, autonomy, and stability. Building on Zhou (2005), the authors elaborate
and illustrate an alternative theoretical model to conceptualize
property rights as a relational concept.]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 19 Jan 2012 11:46:29 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23549?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Local Politics in the Chinese Cultural Revolution: Nanjing Under Military Control]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23268</link><description><![CDATA[Journal Article - Dong Guoqiang, Andrew G. Walder<br />Journal of Asian Studies vol. 70, May 2011<br />China's protracted regional conflicts of 1967 and 1968 have long been understood as struggles between conservative and radical forces whose opposed interests were so deeply rooted in existing patterns of power and privilege that they defied the imposition of military control. This study of Nanjing, a key provincial capital that experienced prolonged factional conflict, yields a new explanation: the conflicts were prolonged precisely because they could not be characterized as pitting "conservatives" against "radicals," making it difficult for central officials, local military forces, or Mao Zedong to decide how to resolve them. Furthermore, Beijing officials, regional military forces, and local civilian cadres were themselves divided against one another, exacerbating and prolonging local conflicts. In competing for approval from central authorities, local factions adopted opportunistic and rapidly shifting political stances designed to portray their opponents as reactionary conservatives -- charges that had no basis in fact.]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 14:01:18 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23268?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[From Control to Ownership: China's Managerial Revolution]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23267</link><description><![CDATA[Journal Article - Andrew G. Walder<br />Management and Organization Review vol. 7, March 2011<br />Over the past decade, the ownership and control of China's corporate sector has finally begun to depart fundamentally from patterns typical in the socialist past. Students of corporate governance have watched these changes with an intense curiosity about their impact on firm performance. Students of comparative economic institutions have examined them for hints of a new variety of Asian capitalism and have sought to anticipate China's international competitiveness and impact. But these changes potentially will create a new corporate elite with greater compensation, personal wealth, and independence from government agencies than ever before. This transformation of China's political economy may eventually alter the Chinese state itself, although the extent and nature of this change are still far from clear. The key questions of interest are the social origins of the new elite, the scale of the economic assets they control, and especially their continuing relationships with party and government agencies. The answers will vary decisively by sector, four of which are described here: a state-owned sector, a privatized sector, a transactional sector, and an entrepreneurial sector. The evolving mix of these sectors will determine the future contours of the Chinese corporate economy.]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 14:01:10 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23267?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Income Determination and Market Opportunity in Rural China, 1978-1996]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23266</link><description><![CDATA[Journal Article - Andrew G. Walder<br />Journal of Comparative Economics vol. 30, June 2002<br />In the second decade of market reform, rural cadre and entrepreneur households enjoy large net income advantages of roughly equal magnitude. Cadre household incomes are primarily from salaries, and they do not decline with increasing levels of rural industrialization. These cross-sectional findings about income determination are reinforced by an event-history analysis of occupational shifts. With large income advantages based on salary income, at no point in market reform have cadres moved into self-employment or private entrepreneurship at higher rates than ordinary farmers. However, village cadres have become the most important source of collective enterprise managers and collective enterprise managers in turn have become the most important source of new private entrepreneurs. Therefore the thriving collective enterprise sector of the 1980's has served as a breeding ground for private enterprise in the 1990's.]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 13:41:09 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23266?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Factions in a Bureaucratic Setting: The Origins of Cultural Revolution Conflict in Nanjing]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23265</link><description><![CDATA[Journal Article - Dong Guoqiang, Andrew G. Walder<br />The China Journal vol. 65, January 2011<br />Mass factions in China during the first two years of the Cultural Revolution have long been understood as interest groups: collections of individuals who shared interests due to common occupations, statuses, or party affiliations. An alternative view, developed primarily with evidence about the distinctive case of Beijing students, emphasizes not the characteristics of participants but histories of political encounters in collapsing bureaucratic hierarchies.]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 14:01:03 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23265?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Alternate Trajectories of the Roles and Influence of China and the United States in Northeast Asia and the Implications for Future Power Configurations]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23238</link><description><![CDATA[Book Chapter - Thomas Fingar, L. Gordon Flake<br />Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, in One Step Back? Reassessing an Ideal Security State for Asia 2025, 2011<br />In the chapter "Alternate Trajectories of the Roles and Influence of China and the United States in Northeast Asia and the Implications for Future Power Configurations" (<i>One Step Back? Reassessing an Ideal Security State for Asia 2025</i>, 2011). Fingar examines several key factors and interactions between countries that he predicts are likely to configure the security structure of Northeast Asia between now and 2025.]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 13:13:25 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23238?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Transitions from State Socialism: A Property Rights Perspective]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23216</link><description><![CDATA[Book Chapter - Andrew G. Walder, Mark Granovetter, Richard Swedberg<br />Westview Press, January 2011<br />In the chapter “Transitions from State Socialism: A Property Rights Perspective” (<i>The Sociology of Economic Life</i>, 2011), Walder perceptively examines property rights changes within the context of the transition from state socialism in Hungary, China, and Vietnam.]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 14:00:09 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23216?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Going Private in China: The Politics of Corporate Restructuring and System Reform]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23191</link><description><![CDATA[Book - Jean C. Oi<br />Shorenstein APARC, distributed by the Brookings Institution Press, 2011<br />With policy-relevant acuity, the contributors to this wide-ranging volume address the questions about reform programs that have plagued China -- and East Asia more broadly -- since the 1990s. While China, Japan, and South Korea have all been criticized for implementing reform too slowly or too selectively, this volume delves into the broader contexts underlying certain institutional decisions. The book seeks to show that seemingly different political economies actually share surprising similarities, and problems. While <i>Going Private in China</i> sheds new light on China's corporate restructuring, it also offers new perspectives on how we think about the process of institutional change.]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 05 Feb 2013 11:09:31 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23191?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23030</link><description><![CDATA[Book - Yongshun Cai<br />Stanford University Press, February 2010<br />]]></description><pubDate>Wed, 20 Mar 2013 16:24:47 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23030?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Nanjing's Failed "January Revolution" of 1967: The Inner Politics of a Provincial Power Seizure]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23021</link><description><![CDATA[Journal Article - Dong Guoqiang, Andrew G. Walder<br />The China Quarterly vol. 203, September 2010<br />Scholarship on factional warfare during the first two years of the Cultural Revolution has long portrayed a struggle between “conservative” factions that sought to preserve the status quo and “radical” factions that sought to transform it. Recent accounts, however, claim that the axis of political conflict was fundamentally transformed after the fall of civilian governments in early 1967, violating the central tenet of this interpretation. A close examination of Nanjing's abortive power seizure of January 1967 addresses this issue in some depth. The power seizure in fact was a crucial turning point: it removed the defenders of local authorities from the political stage and generated a split between two wings of the rebel movement that overthrew them. The political divisions among former rebel allies intensified and hardened in the course of tortuous negotiations in Beijing that were buffeted by confusing political shifts in the capital. This created a contest that was not between “conservatives” and “radicals” over the restoration of the status quo, but about the respective places of the rival radical factions in restored structures of authority.]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 13:59:55 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23021?</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Climate Change and China's Agricultural Sector: Impacts, Adaptation, and Mitigation]]></title><link>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/22969</link><description><![CDATA[Report - Jinxia Wang, Jikun Huang, Scott Rozelle<br />International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council, May 2010<br />]]></description><pubDate>Wed, 12 Dec 2012 13:44:54 PST</pubDate><guid>http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/22969?</guid></item></channel></rss>